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KILLING TIME: THE PROCESS OF WAIVING
APPEAL
THE MICHAEL ROSS DEATH PENALTY CASES
Stephen Blank∗
INTRODUCTION
At approximately 2:00 am on Friday, May 14, 2005, Michael
Bruce Ross waited to die. A tense crowd looked on with mixed
feelings of anticipation, dread, and relief as the executioner
swabbed Ross’s inside arm with alcohol.1 The attendant then
readied the lethal injection and asked if Ross had any final words.2
With eyes clenched Ross merely said, “No, thank you.”3 As the
chemicals began to course through his veins he gasped for air and
then shuddered for the last time.4 At 2:25 am, Michael Ross was
pronounced dead, and so marked the first New England execution
in 45 years.5
∗

Brooklyn Law School Class of 2007; B.A., The Johns Hopkins University,
2004. The author wishes to thank his parents, family, and friends for their
constant support and encouragement. He would also like to thank the journal
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1
R. BOHM, DEATHQUEST: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY AND
PRACTICE OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, (1999), as cited on
Deathpenaltyinfo.org, Descriptions of Execution Methods, http://www.
deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=8&did=479.
2
Shelly Sindland, Connecticut Serial Killer Put to Death, CNN.com, May
13, 2005.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
The only execution prior to Ross’s in New England was that of Joseph
“Mad Dog” Taborsky, on May 17, 1960, for a series of robberies and executionstyle murders. See Michael Bruce Ross: A Compilation of Articles from the
Hartford
Courant
and
Newsday,
http://www.clarkprosecutor.org/
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The trial and execution of Michael Ross attracted mass-media
attention and stirred up a host of controversy and intrigue.6 First
apprehended in the early 1980s, Ross was sentenced to death on
June 13, 1984 for the rape and murder of four Connecticut girls.7
After numerous appeals, on September 21, 2004 Ross’s attorney,
T.R. Paulding Jr., wrote a letter to the trial court indicating that the
defendant intended to “volunteer” to waive any further appeals or
collateral attacks on his death sentences, and that he wanted the
court to set an execution date.8 After 21 years of hearings and
motions, Michael Ross waived his appeal of the death sentence. 9
html/death/US/ross966.htm. Mr. Ross’s unlikely case pushed Connecticut
toward its seventy-fourth execution since it adopted capital punishment in 1893.
Id.
6
See Sindland, supra note 2; Lynne Tuohy, Ross Ruled Competent; Judge
Says Serial Killer’s Decision to Waive Appeals and be Executed is ‘Rational
Choice’, HARTFORD CURRANT, Apr. 23, 2005, at Al; Lynne Tuohy, State
Supreme Court to Rule on Ross; Week Away From Execution, Justices Weigh
Appeal Rights, HARTFORD COURANT, May 6, 2005 at B1.
7
Michael Ross confessed to eight murders in all, four occurring in New
York. Ross’s criminal behavior began when he was a senior at Cornell
University. The eight victims, in chronological order were: (1) Ngoc Tu, (2) 17year-old Tammy Williams, (3) 16 year-old Paula Perrera, (4) Debra Smith
Taylor, (5) 19-year-old Robin Stavinsky, (6 & 7) 14-year-olds April Brunais and
Leslie Shelley, and (8) Wendy Baribeault. The final murder occurred in 1984.
Witnesses reported seeing a thin, white man with glasses following Baribeault
on the day she disappeared, and led authorities to Ross. Ross confessed to six of
the murders, but would only admit to murdering Ngoc Tu and Perrera years
later. Niall Stanage, Please Kill Me, SUNDAY BUS. POST, Feb. 20, 2005.
8
The term “volunteering for execution” is borrowed from Richard Strafer,
Volunteering for Execution: Competency, Voluntariness and the Propriety of
Third Party Intervention, 74 J. CRIM L. & CRIMINOLOGY 860, 861 (Fall 1983),
as quoted in Anthony J. Casey, Maintaining the Integrity of Death: An
Argument for Restricting a Defendant’s Right to Volunteer for Execution at
Certain Stages in Capital Punishment, 30 AM. J. CRIM. L. 75 (2002). The Ross
court emphasized that the defendant had not “waived” his right to further legal
proceedings in the sense that he forfeited the ability to exercise that right in the
future. The parties were in agreement that the defendant could exercise his right
to file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus at any time and that, if he did, the
execution would be stayed. State v. Ross, 272 Conn. 577, 580 (2005).
9
Awaiting his second penalty phase hearing, Ross indicated that he wanted
to proceed pro se. Ross, 272 Conn. at 583. A competency evaluation found Ross
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Defending his decision, Ross stated that he felt that the families of
his victims had suffered enough.10
Ross’s attempt to waive his appeal launched his friends,
family, and opponents of the death penalty into a new sequence of
litigation and emergency competency hearings.11 In a series of
subsequent legal actions, Ross’s family and friends argued that
Ross’s decision was not spurred by a concern for his victims’
families, but rather a lack of competency resulting from a host of
mental illnesses and “Death Row Syndrome.”12
Ross’s waiver of appeal is not unique.13 Since 1976 there have
been 885 executions, 106 of which involved “volunteers.”14 In each
competent. Id. The state’s attorney indicated that he would not engage in
discussions with the defendant unless standby counsel represented him. Id.
Paulding agreed to take on that role. After extensive negotiations, the defendant
and the state entered into a stipulation that an aggravating factor existed and no
mitigating factor existed. Id. The trial court would not allow the stipulation.
Paulding indicated that the defendant had then contacted him in February 2004
regarding his desire to waive further proceedings and that they had spoken
together on numerous occasions over the course of the year. Id.
10
Id.
11
Id. Ross ex rel. Dunham v. Lantz, 408 F.3d 121 (Conn. 2005) (denying
petitioner, Ross’s sister, ‘next friend’ status); In re Ross, 272 Conn. 674 (2005)
(denying Ross’s father, Dan Ross, ‘next friend’ status); Ross ex rel. Smyth v.
Lantz, 396 F.3d 512 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that public defender did not have
‘next friend’ standing prior to proceedings to determine whether defendant was
incompetent to forgo his right to bring habeas corpus proceedings).
12
See infra Part II. Death Row Syndrome is a theory that posits that the
conditions and long stay on death row cause inmates to lose mental competency
and embrace death as an escape from death row. DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION
CENTER [hereinafter DPIC], Time on Death Row, http://www.
deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?&did=1397 (last visited Nov. 23, 2005).
13
John H. Blume, Killing the Willing: “Volunteers,” Suicide and
Competency, 103 MICH. L. REV. 939, 940 (2005).
14
The number 885 is the number of executions until 2003. DPIC,
Searchable Database of Executions, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/
executions.php, as quoted in Blume, supra note 13, at 940.
Prior to 1976, capital punishment was deemed unconstitutional. See Furman
v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). In Furman, the Supreme Court ruled that a
punishment would be “cruel and unusual” if it was too severe for the crime and
was arbitrary. Georgia’s death penalty statute, which gave the jury complete
sentencing discretion, was found unconstitutional and in violation of the Eighth
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of these cases, a court must determine whether the inmate is
competent to understand and appreciate his decision and its
consequence.15 To this end, the court must scrutinize the facts,
attributes, and circumstances of the particular inmate.16 While this
subjective standard allows judges to weed out illegitimate claims
of incompetency, the standard also gives a judge considerable
room to manipulate and interpret facts, testimony, and impressions,
permitting personal biases and beliefs to factor into the decision.
Through a detailed examination of the Ross case, this
Comment will argue that the notion of Death Row Syndrome
complicates the issue of waiving appeal in death penalty cases, and
that Death Row Syndrome could have been found present in the
Ross case. In light of growing national and international
recognition of Death Row Syndrome, the competency test
currently employed by United States’ courts does not adequately
consider an inmate’s motivation for “volunteering,” and threatens a
state’s interest in having a non-arbitrary death penalty. Part I
Amendment. Thus, on June 29, 1972, the Supreme Court effectively voided 40
death penalty statutes, thereby commuting the sentences of 629 death row
inmates around the country and suspending the death penalty generally because
existing statutes were no longer valid. DPIC, History of the Death Penalty Part
I,
Introduction
to
the
Death
Penalty,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=15&did=410 (last visited
Nov. 23, 2005). The first execution since 1976, Gary Gilmore, involved waiver
of appeal. Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012, 1019 (1977). See also Blume, supra
note 13, at 940.
15
“Whether [one waiving appeal] has capacity to appreciate his position
and make a rational choice with respect to continuing or abandoning further
litigation or on the other hand whether he is suffering from a mental disease,
disorder, or defect may substantially affect his capacity.” Rees v. Peyton, 384
U.S. 312, 314 (1966). See also Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 409-10
(1986) (plurality opinion). In Ford v. Wainwright, the court concluded that the
Eighth Amendment barred the execution of insane prisoners and considered
whether the District Court was required to hold an evidentiary hearing to
determine the defendant’s insanity before ruling on the defendant’s petition for
habeas corpus on the ground that he was insane. Id. See DPIC, Time on Death
Row, supra note 12. See also Jane L. McClellan, Stopping the Rush to the Death
House: Third-Party Standing in Death-Row Volunteer Cases, 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
201, 239 (1994).
16
McClennan, supra note 15, at 232-33. See also Rees, 384 U.S. at 312.
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examines the procedural history of the Ross waiver and explores
the court’s rationale for declaring competency. Part II explores an
inmate’s possible motivation for waiving appeal, including the
growing controversy of Death Row Syndrome, and the
Syndrome’s growing acceptance nationally and internationally.
Part III describes the current tests and standards for waiving appeal
and determining competency. Finally, Part IV proposes mandatory,
non-waivable appeals as a solution to the problems arising from
waiving appeal in a death penalty case.
I. MICHAEL ROSS
This section highlights how the Connecticut courts found Ross
competent to waive appeal of his death sentence. The first part of
this section describes the procedural history of the case. The
second part is divided into three sections. The first of these
sections highlights the state’s arguments for finding competency.
The second section presents Ross’s supporters claims for
incompetency and the final section describes how the court found
competency by virtually ignoring the testimony of Ross’s
supporters because they were deemed “biased witnesses.”17
A. Road to Execution: A Brief Procedural History
Michael Ross was indicted for eight counts of capital murder.18
17

Ross, 272 Conn. at 684.
The trial court dismissed two counts for lack of territorial jurisdiction
and, after a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of four counts of capital
felony in violation of § 53a-54b(5) and two counts of capital felony violation of
§ 53a-54b(6). CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-54b.
The statute defines a capital felony as, among other things, murder by a
kidnapper of a kidnapped person during the course of the kidnapping or before
such person is able to return or be returned to safety; murder committed in the
course of the commission of sexual assault in the first degree; murder of two or
more persons in the course of a single transaction; murder of a person under
sixteen years old.
The court could only prosecute Ross for the murders that occurred in
Connecticut, namely Stavinsky, Brunais, Shelley and Baribeault. Ross admitted
to murdering all four, and raping all but Shelley. Ross later asserted that he did
18
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The Superior Court for the district of New London, Connecticut
found that defendant kidnapped and killed four young girls, and
sexually assaulted three of them, in a manner that was especially
cruel, heinous or depraved.19 The trial court imposed the death
penalty on each of the six counts.20 In 1994, the Supreme Court of
Connecticut determined that certain evidentiary rulings by the trial
court during the penalty phase impaired Ross’s ability to establish
a mitigating factor and therefore reversed the imposition of the
death penalty.21 On remand, a second penalty phase hearing was
held before a jury that was not swayed by the newly admitted
evidentiary findings and once more found an aggravating factor for
each capital felony conviction and no mitigating factor. In
accordance with the jury’s findings, the court again imposed a
death sentence.22
not rape Leslie. Stanage, supra note 7. See also State v. Ross, 230 Conn. 183,
188, 194-95 (1994).
19
CONN. GEN. STAT. §53a-46a(h)(4) instructs the court to impose the
sentence of death on the defendant if the jury finds that the defendant committed
the offense in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner. See also State v.
Ross, 230 Conn. 183, 242 (1994). The Connecticut court interpreted the terms
“heinous or depraved” to address the defendant’s state of mind in intentionally
inflicting on his victim extreme pain or torture above and beyond that
necessarily accompanying the underlying killing. Id. at 261.
20
Ross, 230 Conn. at 261.
21
State v. Ross, 230 Conn. 183 (1994), 646 A.2d 1318, 1364. CONN. GEN.
STAT. §53a- 46a (2006) permits the presentation of “any information relevant to
any mitigating factor.” However, the trial court precluded the defendant from
submitting to the jury a letter written by Robert Miller, a court appointed
psychiatric expert who evaluated the defendant for the state and a report by
Miller, which reflected his corroboration of the diagnosis of the defendant
contained in the reports of defense psychiatric experts, on the grounds that it was
not relevant to any mitigating factor and was unauthenticated hearsay and
unreliable. Ross, 646 A.2d at 1364.
22
Ross continued to feel that his mental condition should have served as a
mitigating factor. Stanage, supra note 7. The defendant again appealed the
sentences to the Connecticut Supreme Court, which affirmed the sentences of
death. State v. Ross, 849 A.2d 648, 665 (2004). See also Ross, 272 Conn. at
579-80. In Ross’s own words, “I was sentenced to death by a jury because the
state’s attorney had mocked the defense psychiatric witnesses as both hired guns
and incompetent fools, while at the same time hiding the fact from the jury that
his own expert concurred with the defense experts.” Michael P. Ross, prisoner

BLANK MACROED CORRECTED 7-30-06.DOC

DEATH PENALTY APPEALS

7/30/2006 12:35 PM

741

On September 21, 2004, Ross’s lawyers sent a letter to the trial
judge indicating Ross’s desire to waive appeal of his death
sentence.23 On December 1, 2004, the public defender’s office,
which previously represented Ross, filed in the Superior Court a
motion for permission to appear as next friend of the defendant,
next friend referring to the ability of a third party to continue
appeals on the inmate’s behalf.24 Thereafter, the state filed a
motion seeking a determination as to whether the defendant was
competent to waive his rights to seek post-conviction relief and
whether his waiver was knowingly and voluntarily made.25
The public defender’s office alleged in its motion that it had
standing to appear as the defendant’s next friend because the
defendant was incompetent when he terminated the public
defenders’ representation.26 In addition to the motion for
permission to appear, the public defender’s office filed a motion to
stay Ross’s execution pending a judicial determination as to
whether the defendant was competent to waive appeal.27
At a December 9, 2004 hearing, the court ordered that the
defendant undergo a competency examination.28 In addition, a
hearing on the public defenders’ motion to appear on behalf of the
defendant was scheduled to occur before that examination.29 At
that hearing, the court denied the next friend motion but noted that
#127404, Why I Choose Death Rather than to Fight for Life [hereinafter Ross,
Why I Choose Death], http://www.ccadp.org/michaelross-whyichoose.htm.
23
State v. Ross, 863 A.2d 654, 656 (Conn. 2005).
24
At the same time that the Public Defender’s office was motioning to
appear as next friend of the defendant, they simultaneously filed a motion to
proceed in forma pauperis and a petition for writ of certiorari in the United
States Supreme Court. The public defender’s office represented in the filings
that the defendant had refused to sign an affidavit of indigence in support of the
motion because he was incompetent. The United States Supreme Court denied
the motion on January 10, 2005. Id. at 657. Next friend standing is defined in
Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149 (1990).
25
State v. Ross, 873 A.2d 131, 135 (Conn. 2005).
26
State v. Ross, 863 A.2d 654, 657 (Conn. 2005).
27
Id.
28
The competency examination was to be done by Michael Norko, a
psychiatrist. State v. Ross, 272 Conn. 577, 587 (2005).
29
Id.
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if the defendant were shown to be incompetent at a later date, the
court would reconsider its decision.30
At the competency hearing that followed, the court found Ross
competent.31 The public defender’s office claimed it possessed
evidence, independent of the court-ordered evaluation, to prove
Ross’s incompetence.32 The evidence presented at these
competency hearings are the facts eventually considered by the
Connecticut Supreme Court in deciding this case.
B. Michael Ross: Competent
1. The Evidence of Competency
The Court’s finding of competency was based upon Ross’s
examination by psychiatrist Michael Norko.33 At the competency

30

Id. at 588.
Id. at 591.
32
The court then issued an order authorizing the public defender’s office to
file with the court a written offer of proof detailing the evidence that it would
present at a competency hearing.
The public defender’s office filed an offer of proof, attaching summaries of
its witnesses. The list included summaries of the proposed testimony of Stuart
Grassian, a psychiatrist; Eric Goldsmith, a psychiatrist; five attorneys with the
public defender’s office: Barry Butler, Karen Goodrow, Paula Montonye,
Lauren Weisfeld and John Holdridge; Robert Nave, state death penalty abolition
coordinator for the Connecticut branch of Amnesty International and executive
director of the Connecticut Network to abolish the death penalty; and Dan Ross,
the defendant’s father.
State v. Ross, 273 Conn. 684, 690-91 (2005).
33
After the initial competency hearing on December 9, 2004, the court
decided that it needed an expert opinion. The court ordered the defendant to
undergo a competency examination by Michael Norko and scheduled a
competency hearing for December 28, 2004. Norko first evaluated Ross’s
competency in 1995, but had no contact with him between 1995 and his meeting
with Ross on December 15, 2004. On December 15, 2004 Norko met with Ross
for approximately three hours. He also spoke with two psychologists, a
psychiatric social worker and a psychiatrist, all of whom had known Ross for
many years. State v. Ross, 272 Conn. 577, 591 (2005).
31
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hearing, Norko testified that Ross could make a rational decision.34
Norko found that Ross “had an excellent understanding of his legal
position and the ramifications of his decision to forgo any further
legal proceedings.”35 Norko did not believe that Ross was trying to
kill himself.36 Rather, Norko believed that Ross’s decision was
“based on [Ross’s] belief that it would be morally wrong to subject
the families of his victims to the pain that would be caused by
proceedings that could go on for years.”37
Norko’s evaluation found that Ross did not suffer from clinical
depression.38 Norko supported this assertion by pointing out that
Ross was sleeping well, had a normal appetite and a good energy
level.39 Norko determined that Ross was able to concentrate and
process thoughts, had no memory disturbances and expressed no
suicidal thoughts, despite a past history of suicide attempts.40
Norko did find that Ross was occasionally emotional, but he
credited that to the reality of facing execution.41
Norko was next asked to determine whether any of Ross’s
mental ailments affected his decision-making.42 Norko stated that
Ross suffered from several mental diseases, including: “a
depressive disorder not otherwise specified,” sexual sadism,
possibly “an anxiety disorder not otherwise specified,” and a
personality disorder with narcissistic, borderline and antisocial
traits. 43 Ross was treated for those ailments while in prison, and
34

Id. at 587.
Id.
36
Id. at 593.
37
Id. at 589.
38
Id.
39
State v. Ross, 272 Conn. 577, 589 (2005).
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Id. at 587.
43
A depressive disorder not otherwise specified is a disorder with
depressive characteristics, but which does not meet the criteria for major
depression. Id. at 590. Norko’s diagnosis of sexual sadism was based on the
reports of other psychiatrists. Id. at 589. Personality disorder with narcissistic,
borderline and antisocial traits or a full blown narcissistic personality disorder
with borderline and antisocial traits is an Axis II disorder according to the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders-Fourth Edition (DSM35
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took Depo-Lupron to reduce his sex drive, and Klonopin and
Wellbutrin, which are anti-anxiety medications. Ross also took
Vistaril, an anti-anxiety medication, on an as-needed basis.44
Norko argued that any detrimental affects the diseases may have
had on Ross’s decision-making capacity were counteracted by the
prescribed medications.45 Furthermore, in Norko’s professional
opinion, the different medications probably improved Ross’s
ability to make decisions rather than interfered.46
Norko’s analysis runs counter to Ross’s own assertions about
his mental condition and subsequent effect of his medications on
his decision-making process.47 Ross wrote that:
I was under the control of a mental illness. That monster
lives in my head and it will always be there, somewhere
hidden away in my mind. But that monster is not me. I was
never really sure of that, even during my original trial,
because that monster in my mind was so intertwined with
who I was that even I had trouble making the distinction
between it and me. It was only about three years after I
went to death row, after I finally received approval for my
medicationfirst weekly injections of Depo-Provera, and
now monthly injections of Depo-Lupron that the monster in
my mind started to lose its power and control over me and I
was finally able to begin to see what it really was; who I
really was; and what the difference was between that
monster and myself.48
IV). According to the experts’ testimony, opinions can differ as to whether one
has enough of the traits listed in a disorder in the DSM-IV to qualify as an actual
disorder. For example, Norko opined that Ross only had some narcissistic traits
as part of a general personality disorder, while Gentile concluded that Ross had
enough of those traits to qualify for a full-blown narcissistic personality disorder
diagnosis. There is no substantial difference. See Ross Competency Ruling
Analysis, A Public Defender: Protecting the Right to Effective Assistance of
Counsel,
http://publicdefender.typepad.com/public_
defender_blog/2005/04/ross_competency.html (last visited Nov. 24, 2005).
44
State v. Ross, 272 Conn. 577, 583 (2005).
45
Id. at 590.
46
Id.
47
Id. at 591.
48
Ross, Why I Choose Death, supra note 22.
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Despite “the monster losing power,” Ross later admitted on direct
testimony that he continued to take Vistaril on an as-needed basis
when he experienced episodes of intense anxiety and believed that
he should not make important decisions during those moments of
heightened anxiety.49 Despite these discrepancies, Norko testified
in his report that Ross’s motivation for waiving appeal was to save
his victims’ families further pain.50
The court’s report contains discrepancies that challenge Ross’s
alleged motivation.51 For instance, at the hearing, Ross testified
that he had occasional doubts about whether his execution would
end the pain of the victims’ families. He also testified that he
would accept a sentence of life imprisonment immediately if it
were offered.52
Nonetheless, at the conclusion of the hearing, the court
accepted Norko’s evaluation and found Ross competent within the
meaning of Rees.53 The court found that Ross was:
[n]ot making his decision on the basis of any threats,
promises or coercion; he was lucid, educated, intelligent,
insightful, knowledgeable, firm in his decision and
understanding of the questions posed to him; had a grasp of
the legal issues involved and was aware of his legal
options; none of the medications taken by the defendant
have affected his ability to understand the proceedings or to
make rational decisions; the defendant is not motivated by
a desire to commit suicide, but by concern for the victims’
families; and the defendant has the capacity to understand
his choices.54
This explanation focused on Ross’s cognitive ability to
understand the decision. The court found the decision to be Ross’s
own, and held that he could understand the consequences and

49

Ross did note that the episodes of heightened anxiety were brief. Ross,
272 Conn. at 590.
50
Id.
51
Id. at 590-95.
52
Id. at 595.
53
Id. at 591.
54
Id.
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make rational choices.55
2. Arguments of Ross’s Supporters
At the rehearing in the Superior Court of Connecticut, the
public defender’s office represented that it had evidence of Ross’s
incompetence that had not been presented to any court.56 This
evidence was presented at further competency hearings in April
2005.57 While the Superior Court initially heard the evidence, its
decisions were affirmed by the Supreme Court of Connecticut.
At the April 2005 hearings, the court heard from Dan Ross,
Ross’s father, Norko, and psychiatrists Stuart Grassian, Eric
Goldsmith, and Suzanne Gentile.58 The depositions of Martha
Elliot, a journalist and friend, and Susan P., the defendant’s
girlfriend, were also read into the record.59 Ross’s supporters
argued that Ross’s decision to waive appeal was involuntary and
also that Ross’s decision was motivated by a desire to commit
suicide.60 Psychiatrist Stewart Grassian argued that “prisoners held
in segregated confinement frequently develop mental
disturbances.”61 Grassian went on to note that “these disturbances
can affect the prisoners’ ability to assist in their own defense;
living under sentence of death can cause an overwhelming sense of
helplessness and fear resulting in a desperate need to regain control
by waiving further challenges to the death sentence.”62 The
conditions of Ross’s confinement may have exacerbated his preexisting mental illnesses and resulted in suicidal ideation.63
Grassian testified that Ross’s personality disorder and
55

Id. at 609-11.
State v. Ross, 273 Conn. 684, 690 (2005).
57
Id. at 696.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
State v. Ross, 272 Conn. 577, 593 (2005).
61
These mental disturbances include impaired alertness, attention and
concentration, hyperresponsiveness to stimuli, withdrawal, obsessive
preoccupation with trivial matters, sleep disturbances and psychotic delirium. Id.
62
Id. at 593.
63
Id.
56
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narcissism had rendered his decision to volunteer involuntary.64
While Norko and Gentile testified that Ross’s narcissism had no
substantial effect on his ability to make rational choices, Grassian
and Goldsmith believed that Ross’s narcissism made it impossible
for Ross to bear the perceived humiliation of backing down from
his decision to volunteer.65 Grassian and Goldsmith identified
several narcissistic traits, including: grandiosity, inability to
empathize, self-centeredness and arrogance.66 These elements
compelled Ross to posture as a good and noble person, who was
waiving appeal to spare his victims’ families further pain, when in
reality, Ross was motivated by narcissism. 67
This argument was supported by the testimony of Ross’s own
father.68 Dan Ross stated that Michael Ross was extremely
narcissistic and “not unlike a child before the age of reason.”69 He
testified that Ross reveled in the attention that being a martyr
brings, and therefore had an ulterior motive to proceed with his
execution.70
Grassian and Goldsmith argue that Ross had an ulterior motive
which they inferred from his attributes and actions.71 The core of
their argument was that Norko failed to recognize that the
defendant’s intelligence would make it possible for him to conceal
his “hidden agenda.”72 Grassian argued that Norko did not
recognize Ross’s intelligence and thus failed to properly scrutinize
Ross’s words and actions.73 Through analyzing Ross’s words and
actions, Grassian found Ross incompetent to make a rational
64

State v. Ross, 273 Conn. 684, 697 (2005).
Id.
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
State v. Ross, 272 Conn. 577, 595 (2005).
69
Id.
70
Id. at 595-96.
71
Norko specifically stated that in the past, Ross “has hidden things from
the prison’s mental health staff.” Id. at 594. Ross was extremely intelligent and
graduated from Cornell University. Pat Eaton, After 45 Years, a U.S. State
Executes Eight-time Killer, THE ADVERTISER, May 14, 2005, at 60.
72
State v. Ross, 272 Conn. 577, 594 (2005).
73
Id. at 593.
65
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decision because his decision to waive appeal was arguably
uncontrollable and motivated by Ross’s narcissism.74
There were two distinct instances to which Grassian called the
court’s attention. The first was when Ross was quoted as stating
that the other prisoners on death row were brutal murderers who
took no responsibility for their crimes and engaged in bravado and
grandstanding, while he had the “real guts” to go forward with his
execution.75 Garison believed that this undermined the claim that
Ross was motivated by consideration for his victims’ families.
The second piece of evidence is a letter, written by Ross to
Martha Elliott, a journalist.76 The letter indicated that Ross’s
decision was driven more by a desire to end his own pain than by
concern for the families of his victims, and that Ross knew that he
could not say that publicly.77 The letter explicitly states that Ross
believed he suffered from “Death Row Syndrome,” which is the
theory that a prolonged duration on death row creates depression in
inmates and encourages inmates to seek death as an escape from
death row.78 Grassian suggests that Ross became incapable of
bearing his distress and despair, and that suicidal ideation was a
result of his time and conditions on death row, leading to his
ultimate decision to volunteer.79
3. Competency Ruling
At the competency hearing, the court found Ross competent to
waive appeal and found the analyses of Norko and Gentile more
credible than the expert testimony of Grassian and Goldsmith and
the opinions of Dan Ross, Susan P., and Martha Elliot.80 The court
concluded that Grassian’s proposed testimony concerning the
effect of segregated confinement on the defendant’s ability to

74
75
76
77
78
79
80

Id. at 663-64.
Id. at 664.
Id. at 663.
Id.
State v. Ross, 873 A.2d 131, 139 n.8 (Conn. 2005).
Id. at 138 n.6.
Id. at 140.
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make a rational and voluntary choice was speculative.81 However,
the court determined that Ross did have some symptoms of
depression, possibly caused by the isolation and prolonged stay on
death row.82
The court also held that the testimony of Dan Ross, Susan P.,
and Martha Elliot was unpersuasive because they were biased
witnesses.83 The court disregarded the opinions of Dan Ross,
Susan P, and Martha Elliot, because these witnesses were
“opposed to the death penalty in general, are close friends or
family of the [defendant], and do not personally support his
decision to die.”84 Ross’s supporters argue that the court never
fully inquired into Ross’s possible suicidal tendencies or whether
one of Ross’s mental illnesses could have affected his decisionmaking capability. After listening to all the testimony, the court put
more weight on Norko’s testimony than that of Ross’s supporters
and opted not to address the issue of Death Row Syndrome in its
opinion.
II. DEATH ROW SYNDROME
In the Ross case, Ross indicated that he was isolated for
twenty-two or twenty-three hours a day, found the conditions of
his confinement intolerable, felt helpless and out of control, and
had a tendency toward obsessive thoughts.85 These symptoms have
all been associated with Death Row Syndrome.86 Death Row
Syndrome is the theory that the mental stress of prolonged
exposure to death row can cause incompetency in inmates.87
International courts first recognized the notion of Death Row
81

State v. Ross, 272 Conn. 577, 610-11 (2005). In his report, Norko found
that the defendant had frequent visitors, corresponded with numerous people and
regularly prayed, read, listened to music, watched television and did puzzles and
word games. Id. at 610.
82
State v. Ross, 273 Conn. 684, 696-97 (2005).
83
Ross, 273 Conn. at 684.
84
Id.
85
State v. Ross, 272 Conn. 577, 663-64 (2005).
86
DPIC, Time on Death Row, supra note 12.
87
Id.
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Syndrome in Soering v. United Kingdom,88 but actually identified
examples of the syndrome in Pratt v. Attorney General for
Jamaica and Pratt and Morgan v. Jamaica.89 United States judges
and courts, however, have been reluctant to agree with the
international courts regarding the pervasiveness of Death Row
Syndrome.
A. Death Row Syndrome Generally: Why an Inmate May Waive
Appeal
Many factors may lead an inmate to waive appeal of his death
sentence. These factors can run parallel or counter to the state’s
overriding interest in preserving life and preventing suicide.90 In
some cases, inmates do not truly want to die, but waive appeal and
expedite their death sentence because they accept the finality of
their punishment.91 In other cases, inmates may waive appeal
88

11. Eur. Hum. Rts. Rev. 439 (1989).
Pratt and Morgan were combined death penalty cases. Pratt v. Att’y Gen.
for Jamaica, [1994] 2 App. Cas. 1, 22, cited in Natalia Schifrin, Current
Development: Jamaica Withdraws the Right of Individual Petition Under the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 92 A.J.I.L. 563, 565
(1998); Pratt and Morgan v. Jamaica, Communication Nos. 210/1986, 225/1987
(views adopted Apr. 7, 1987), UN Doc. CCPR/C.35/D.210/1986 and 225/1986
cited in Schifrin, supra, at 565.
90
See Grasso v. State, 857 P.2d 802, 811 (Okla. 1993) (Chapel, J., specially
concurring) (stating that the state has a strong interest in preventing defendants
from manipulating the justice system; “the State must not become an unwitting
partner in a defendant’s suicide.”) as quoted in McClellan, supra note 15, at
211. The state has an interest in preserving life; for example, if a death-row
inmate goes on a hunger strike, Federal Bureau of Prisons regulations allow the
inmate to be force-fed. McClellan, supra note 15, at 211.
91
For example, in Comer v. Stewart, Ronald Charles Comer waived appeal
of the death penalty and accepted his punishment. Upon examination, Comer
was told that he had a good chance of getting a new trial, having his sentence
mitigated to life imprisonment or at least substantially delaying his execution.
However, Comer replied, “I did it” and refused to prolong his punishment on
procedural grounds. Comer v. Stewart, 230 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1061 (D. Ariz.
2002). See also State v. Ross, 272 Conn. 577, 653 (2005). See Mathew T.
Norman, Standards and Procedures for Determining Whether a Defendant is
Competent to Make the Ultimate ChoiceDeath; Ohio’s New Precedent for
89
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because of Death Row Syndrome: depression caused by extended
tenure and conditions on death row.92
The easiest scenario for a court is when an inmate waives
appeal to accept the finality of his punishment.93 In such a
situation, the inmate does not necessarily want to die, but rather
takes responsibility for his or her actions. For example, in 1997,
Scott Dawn Carpenter expedited his death sentence because he felt
that the punishment fit his crime.94 Carpenter was convicted of
murdering a store clerk in 1994.95 After the conviction, he sent a
letter to the Oklahoma Supreme Court explaining why he wanted
to waive appeal, stating, “I have never claimed innocence to the
crime I committed, was charged with and found guilty of murder.
The State affirmed their decision on the first step in the appellate
process, and I feel and want the punishment of death carried out as
soon as possible.”96 At the subsequent competency hearing,
Carpenter defended his choice, indicating that the best he could
hope for was commutation to life in prison and that he saw no
future in spending sixty or seventy years locked up.97 Content that
his decision was motivated by acceptance of his punishment, the
court found Carpenter competent.98
Death Row “Volunteers,” 13 J.L. & HEALTH 103, 113-16 (1998-1999).
92
Norman, supra note 91, at 113-16. An example of an inmate waiving
appeal because of depression is Don Jay Miller, in Miller v. Stewart, 231 F.3d
1248, 1251-52 (9th Cir. 2000). Miller allegedly waived appeal because he
became incompetent on death row. Miller first contested his death penalty
sentence, but later decided to waive appeal. Experts in the case noted that
Miller’s history of physical, psychological and sexual abuse as a child make him
highly susceptible to the effects of physical isolation on death row, which could
cause psychological decompensation to the point of becoming incompetent.
Miller, 231 F.3d at 1251-52. See also Ross, 272 Conn. 577.
93
McClellan, supra note 15, at 211.
94
Norman, supra note 91, at 113, citing Jean Pagel, Slain Man’s Hopes for
Answers Before Execution, THE DAILY OKLAHOMAN, May 7, 1997, at 01.
95
Norman, supra note 91, at 113.
96
Id.
97
Id. at 114.
98
Carpenter was executed by lethal injection five months later. Id. at 11314. See also id. at 114, quoting Michael Graczyk, Texas Executes Convicted
Killer Benjamin Stone, AUSTIN- AMERICAN STATESMAN, Sept. 26, 1997, at B4
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In some cases, an inmate’s impetus for waiving appeal
conflicts with a state’s interest in preserving life and preventing
suicide. Opponents of capital punishment point to numerous
studies citing Death Row Syndrome or “Death Row Phenomenon”
as depression caused by being on death row for many years
causing inmates to waive appeal.99 Death Row Syndrome and
Death Row Phenomenon are legal terms, not clinical ones.100 The
American Psychiatric Association does not recognize Death Row
Syndrome or Death Row Phenomenon.101
When the United States Constitution was written, the time
between sentencing and execution could be measured in days or
weeks.102 In the wake of the Supreme Court-mandated suspension
of the death penalty from 1972 to 1976, numerous reforms have
been introduced to create a less arbitrary system, arbitrary referring
to ensuring that the process used to convict an inmate to death is
accurate and thorough.103 This has resulted in lengthier appeals, as
mandatory sentencing reviews have become the norm, and
continual changes in laws and technology have necessitated
reexamination of individual sentences.104Today, death row inmates
live in a state of constant uncertainty over when they will be
executed. For some inmates this isolation and anxiety results in a
sharp deterioration of their mental capacity and a desire to end the
agony of each new day in prison.105 Death row inmates typically
(discussing a 1997 case where a court permitted Benjamin Stone to expedite his
death sentence after killing his wife and stepdaughter because Stone rationalized
that, “I’m not appealing anything, what’s the point? I’m guilty. I feel like I’m
doing the right thing. Why prolong it? . . . As far as I’m concerned, it’s the only
way I’ll find peace of mind.”).
99
Strafer, supra note 8, at 869.
100
David Wallace-Wells, What is Death Row Syndrome? And Who Came
Up With It?, Feb. 1, 2005, http://www.slate.com/id/2112901/.
101
Death Row Syndrome is also unrecognized in the American Psychiatric
Association handbook and the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders. Id.
102
DPIC, Time on Death Row, supra note 12.
103
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972); DPIC, Time on Death Row,
supra note 12.
104
DPIC, Time on Death Row, supra note 12.
105
Id.
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spend over a decade awaiting execution; some prisoners having
been on death row for well over twenty years.106 During this time
the inmates are generally isolated from other prisoners, excluded
from prison educational and employment programs, and sharply
restricted in terms of visitation and exercise, spending as many as
twenty-three hours a day alone in their cells.107 These conditions
have prompted innocent and guilty inmates to waive appeal and
raises the question of whether death row prisoners are receiving
two distinct punishments: the death sentence itself, and the years of
living in conditions tantamount to solitary confinement.108
B. Death Row Syndrome in International Courts
International courts first identified the existence of Death Row
Syndrome. In fact, the term was first coined during extradition
hearings in the United Kingdom for Jen Soering.109 Soering was a
German citizen who was arrested in England and charged with
committing murders in Virginia in 1985.110 Soering argued to the
European Court of Human Rights that the conditions he would face
during the lengthy period between sentencing and execution would
be as psychologically damaging as torture.111 Soering presented
evidence that the prison conditions at Mecklenburg Correctional
Center, where the majority of Virginia’s death row prisoners were
interned, were unduly harsh, and he submitted evidence as to the
“extreme stress, psychological deterioration and risk of
106

Strafer, supra note 8, at 869-70. See also DPIC, Time on Death Row,
supra note 12; State v. Ross, 863 A.2d 654, 659 (2005); 272 Conn. 577, 585
(2005). Ross spent twenty years on death row. Id.
107
DPIC, Time on Death Row, supra note 12.
108
Some have argued that an innocent person would never seek execution,
but at least one such person, Isidore Zimmerman, willingly sought execution
because of the intense psychological torture of being on death row. Zimmerman
was later exonerated. Strafer, supra note 8, at 869 as found in McClellan, supra
note 15, at 211.
109
A psychologist in the extradition of Soering first coined the term “death
row phenomenon.” Soering v. United Kingdom, 11 Eur. Hum. Rts. Rev. 439
(1989).
110
Wallace-Wells, supra note 100.
111
Id. See also Soering, 11 Eur. Hum. Rts. Rev. at 439.
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homosexual abuse and physical attack undergone by prisoners on
death row.”112
The court recognized that the Council of Europe abolished the
death penalty in times of peace and stressed that the “condemned
prisoner must for many years endure the conditions on death row
and the anguish and mounting tension of living in the ever-present
shadow of death.”113 The court went on to note how prisoners who
utilize the appeals process can be placed in the “death house”
awaiting imminent execution several times during incarceration.114
It was the inability to know when death would come that qualified
the long wait for the death penalty as a cruel and unusual penalty
under the European Convention.115 Citing the possibility of
Soering developing Death Row Syndrome as justification for its
ruling, the court found that under the European Convention,
Soering could not be sentenced to death under the current prison
conditions.116
The Soering case identified the possibility of Death Row
Syndrome, but in the Pratt and Morgan cases in 1993, Jamaica’s
court of last resort, the London-based Judicial Committee on the
Privy Council, was confronted with actual examples of Death Row
Syndrome.117 Pratt and Morgan had been convicted of murder and
sentenced to death in January 1979.118 They were held on death
row for fourteen years.119 Three times, their death warrants were
read to them and they were placed in condemned cells adjacent to
the gallows.120 Several appeals were made over the years and
112

Ed Morgan, On Art and the Death Penalty: Invitation to a Beheading,
15 CARDOZO STUD. L & LIT. 279, 283-84 (2003).
113
Id. (quoting Soering, 11 Eur. Hum. Rts. Rev., at n. 5 para. 106).
114
Id.
115
Id.
116
Id. See DPIC, Time on Death Row, supra note 12. See also WallaceWells, supra note 100.
117
Pratt v. Attorney General for Jamaica, [1994] 2 App. Cas. 1, 22; Pratt
and Morgan v. Jamaica, Communication Nos. 210/1986, 225/1987 (views
adopted Apr. 7, 1987), UN Doc. CCPR/C.35/D.210/1986 and 225/1986.
118
Schifrin, supra note 89, at 565.
119
Id.
120
Id.
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delays occurred throughout the process.121 The British court found
that it was “inhuman and degrading” to hang anyone who had
spent more than five years on death row.122 The court ruled that
such prisoners must have their death sentences commuted to life
imprisonment.123
Despite the Soering and Pratt and Morgan rulings, no
uniformity currently exists among foreign courts that have
considered the issue of Death Row Syndrome. For instance, in
Kindler v. Canada, the Canadian Supreme Court ruled that
extraditing a convicted capital fugitive to the United States, where
the defendant would possibly be subject to Death Row
Phenomenon, did not violate Canadian Law.124 In contrast to
Soering, the Canadian court did not refuse extradition based upon
Death Row Syndrome.125 However, the Canadian court
acknowledged the existence of Death Row Syndrome and arguably
strengthened the validity, scope, and influence of the Syndrome.126
Foreign courts vary as to the definition, application, and
treatment of Death Row Syndrome. For instance, the court in Pratt
and Morgan v. Jamaica considered the specific facts of the case
but then determined that more than five years on death row
essentially resulted in Death Row Syndrome per se.127 In contrast,
the court in Soering based its holding on an analysis of particular
121

One such delay occurred when legal papers were put in the wrong
bundle and forgotten. Earl Pratt and Another Appellant v. Attorney General for
Jamaica and Another Respondents, [1994] 2 A.C. 1, 1993 WL 963003, at *22
(P.C.) (appeal taken from the Court of Appeal of Jamaica).
122
Id. at *35.
123
Id. at *35-36. “This resulted in the commutation of scores of death
sentences in Jamaica, Bermuda, Barbados, and Trinidad and Tobago, cutting the
death row population of English-speaking Caribbean nations by more than half.”
DPIC, Time on Death Row, supra note 12 (citing Don Bohning, Convicts Face
Faster Trip to the Gallows; Caribbean Irked at Legal Delays, MIAMI HERALD,
Sept. 8, 1998, at 1A.)
124
[1991] 2 S.C.R. 779. See also Kindler v. Canada, No. 470/1991,
reported at 14 Hum. Rts. L.J. 307 (1993).
125
Kindler, 2 S.C.R. 779.
126
Id.
127
Pratt and Morgan v. Jamaica, Communication Nos. 210/1986, 225/1987
(views adopted Apr. 7, 1987), UN Doc. CCPR/C.35/D.210/1986 and 225/1986.
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facts.128 However, despite these variations in the diagnosis and
application of Death Row Syndrome, international courts have, at a
minimum, acknowledged the detrimental effects that extended
stays on death row can have on an inmate.
C. The United States Death Penalty, the Eighth Amendment,
and Death Row Syndrome
The United States death penalty has a long and controversial
history concerning whether the death penalty is unconstitutional as
“cruel and unusual punishment” under the Eighth Amendment.
This section begins with Furman v. Georgia to show the Supreme
Court’s initial stance on the constitutionality of the death
penalty.129 This section then addresses Ropper v. Simmons and
how the Court has recently looked toward international courts for
guidance on interpreting the Eighth Amendment in death penalty
cases.130 Finally, in the wake of growing international recognition
of Death Row Syndrome, this section shows how some Supreme
Court Justices and state courts have acknowledged the possible
unconstitutionality of prolonged exposure to death row.131
In the United States, beginning in the 1960s, it was suggested
that the death penalty was a “cruel and unusual punishment” that
violated the Eighth Amendment of the United States
Constitution.132 In 1972, in Furman v. Georgia, the Supreme Court
set the standard that a punishment would be “cruel and unusual” if
128

Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) (1989). See
contra Kindler v. Canada, [1991] S.C.R. 779.
129
Furman, 408 U.S. at 238.
130
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), 125 S.Ct. 1183, 1198.
131
See Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045 (1995) (Stevens, J., respecting the
denial of certiorari); Elledge v. Florida, 525 U.S. 944 (1998) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting from a denial of certiorari); Jones v. State, 740 So. 2d 520, 525 (Fla.
1999).
132
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”). This
rationale evolved from Trop v. Dulles, which stated that the Eighth Amendment
contained an “evolving standard of decency that marked the progress of a
maturing society.” 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). See also DPIC, History of the Death
Penalty Part I, supra note 14.
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it was too severe for the crime, if it was arbitrary, if it offended
society’s sense of justice, or it if was not more effective than a less
severe penalty.133 Furman was a direct challenge to a death
sentence on Eighth Amendment grounds, and resulted in the
voiding of forty different state death penalty statutes.134 The
holding in Furman was that specific death penalty statutes were
unconstitutional because they were “arbitrary.”135 The Court
opened the door for states to rewrite their death penalty statutes to
eliminate the problems cited in Furman.136 Soon, thirty-seven
states enacted revised death penalty statutes.137
In the wake of European recognition of Death Row Syndrome,
there remains an argument that prolonged tenure on death row may
violate the Eighth Amendment,138 and in recent years the Supreme
Court has looked to international courts when interpreting the
Eighth amendment.139 In Roper v. Simmons, the Supreme Court
held that the Eighth Amendment forbids the imposition of the
death penalty on juvenile offenders.140 The court observed the
“stark reality that the United States is the only country in the world
that continued to give official sanction to the juvenile death
penalty.”141 This case shows the suggestive impact and influence
of international standards and law on United States jurisprudence,
especially concerning the Eighth Amendment.142
The issue of the constitutionality of a long stay on death row

133

408 U.S. 238 (1972). See also DPIC, History of Death Penalty Part I,
supra note 14.
134
DPIC, History of Death Penalty Part I, supra note 14.
135
However, Justices Brennan and Marshall felt that the death penalty
itself, as a punishment, was unconstitutional. Furman, 408 U.S. at 272, 275
(Brennan, J. concurring); Id. at 358 (Marshall, J., concurring); Lackey, 514 U.S.
at 1045 (Stevens, J., respecting the denial of certiorari).
136
DPIC, History of Death Penalty Part I, supra note 14.
137
Id.
138
Id. See also Lonchar v. Thomas, 517 U.S. 314 (1996) (refusing to find
the death penalty unconstitutional).
139
Roper, 543 U.S. at 551.
140
Lackey, 520 U.S. at 1198 (juvenile defined as under the age of 18).
141
Id.
142
Id.
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was presented to the U.S. Supreme Court in Lackey v. Texas.143
The case involved Clarence Lackey, who had spent seventeen
years on death row when he petitioned the Supreme Court to
decide whether such an extensive confinement constituted cruel
and unusual punishment.144
While the Court denied certiorari to hear Lackey, Justice John
Paul Stevens wrote an accompanying opinion to the denial, which
questioned the constitutionality of the long delays between
sentencing and execution.145 Justice Stevens argued in the
memorandum that the reinstatement of the death penalty in 1976
rested on its serving two principal societal purposes: retribution
and deterrence. In his view, “It is arguable that neither ground
retains any force for prisoners who have spent some 17 years under
a sentence of death.”146
Similarly, in his dissent in the Supreme Court’s refusal to hear
Elledge v. Florida, Justice Stephen Breyer noted that Elledge’s
argument that twenty-three years under a sentence of death is
unusual and “especially cruel” was worth considering.147 Breyer
wrote that “after such a delay, an execution may well cease to
serve the legitimate penological purposes that otherwise provide a
necessary constitutional justification for the death penalty.”148 In
light of growing international concerns, Justice Breyer further
noted that “British jurists have suggested that the Bill of Rights of
1689, a document relevant to the interpretation of our own
Constitution, may forbid, as cruel and unusual, significantly lesser
delays.”149
The Florida and New Jersey state courts have held that
prolonged tenure on death row can amount to cruel and unusual

143

Lackey, 514 U.S. at 1045.
Id. See also Lackey, 520 U.S. at 1183.
145
Id.
146
Id. (Stevens, J. respecting the denial of certiorari).
147
Elledge, 525 U.S. at 944 (Breyer, J., dissenting from a denial of
certiorari).
148
Id.; Elledge v. Florida, 142 L. Ed. 2d 303, 304 (U.S. 1998) Breyer, J.,
dissenting from a denial of cert.).
149
Elledge, 525 U.S. at 944.
144
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punishment.150 In Jones v. State, the Florida state courts tried and
convicted Ronnie Jones of first-degree murder, and sentenced him
to death in 1981.151 In 1985, on appeal, Jones claimed that he was
incompetent at the time of his trial.152 The Supreme Court of
Florida ordered the trial court to hold a competency hearing, which
the trial court failed to conduct until 1997.153 In 1999, the Florida
Supreme Court held that it could not “accept any excuse or have
any tolerance for the state placing a person on death row and
allowing a person to linger there for the period of time, or even
near the period of time, that has occurred in this case.”154 Jones’s
due process rights were impacted by the twelve-year delay in
holding the competency hearing, and it was impossible to give him
a retrospective competency determination that complied with due
process.155
In New Jersey, Judge Reginald Stanton sentenced Thomas J.
Koskovich to death for his role in the ambush and murder of two
men in 1997, but only if the execution was carried out in five
years.156 The judge criticized the nation’s courts for delays in
150

Jones v. State, 740 So. 2d 520, 525 (Fla. 1999); Robert Hanley, Judge
Orders Death Penalty With a Five-Year Deadline, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 1999, at
B5.
151
Jones, 740 So. 2d at 521. Jones attached affidavits from psychologists
and from lawyers who represented him at various stages of the trial who
affirmed that appellant seemed incompetent. Id. at 522.
152
Id.
153
In 1995, Jones filed an amended motion for post-conviction relief. “The
trial court then ordered an evidentiary hearing on the original competency
issue.” Id.
154
Id. at 526.
155
Id. at 523-24.
156
If the state did not carry out the execution by May 7, 2004, the judge
ordered that the sentence automatically be changed to life in prison. DPIC,
International Perspective on the Death Penalty, supra note 64, citing Hanley,
supra note 149. Koskovich lured two deliverymen to an abandoned house in
Franklin, New Jersey, through a false order for two pizzas, and then murdered
them. Id. As of 2002, the state Supreme Court upheld the convictions but found
that Stanton’s instructions to the jury in the penalty phase could have unfairly
swayed its decision to impose the death penalty against Koskovich. Jury
selection for a new penalty phase was set to start September 9, 2002. Mary P.
Gallagher, New Jersey Defenders, AG Seeks Freeze of Capital Case, National
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executions, noting that “the process has become unacceptably cruel
to defendants . . . who spend long years under sentence of death
while the judicial system conducts seemingly interminable
proceedings which remind many observers of a cruelly whimsical
cat toying with a mouse.”157 Judge Stanton went on to mention that
in capital cases around the country, an average of ten years elapses
between the date of sentence and execution and that “if we [the
United States] are to have a death penalty, then we should have the
skill, the courage, and the decency to carry out the death sentence
in a reasonably expeditious manner.”158
In both Florida and New Jersey, the respective state courts
identified conditions amounting to Death Row Syndrome.159 While
never explicitly citing Death Row Syndrome, the courts recognized
the potential psychological consequences of extended stays on
death row.160 In light of growing national and international concern
and criticism over the death penalty and the Supreme Court’s
acknowledgment of international perspectives concerning the death
penalty and the Eighth Amendment in Ropper, mandatory appeals
is a possible solution that could resolve some of the controversy
and problems associated with competency tests and Death Row
Syndrome.
III. UNITED STATES COMPETENCY TESTS
Two landmark Supreme Court cases established the tests for

Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, http://www.nacdl.org/sl_
docs.nsf/A1BF9DDA21904164852566D50069B69C/5568DC0C9137AE7D852
56C3A0052F38B?OpenDocument (last visited Jan. 27, 2006).
157
Judge Stanton did not know of any similar rulings by trials judges in
capital cases. DPIC, International Perspective on the Death Penalty: A Costly
Isolation of the U.S., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=45
&did=536 (last visited Nov. 3, 2005).
158
Judge Stanton also suggested that the United States “be well advised to
join most of the civilized countries of the world in abolishing the death penalty.”
Id.
159
Id. See also Kindler No. 470/1991, reported at 14 Hum. Rts. L.J. 307.
160
Jones, 740 So. 2d at 524. See also DPIC, International Perspective on
the Death Penalty, supra note 64, citing Hanley, supra note 149.
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waiving appeal in a death penalty case. Rees v. Peyton161
established the competency test for death penalty cases and
Whitmore v. Arkansas162 created the requirements for “next friend”
status.163 In combination, these decisions arguably create a loose
standard by which a court can prolong the appeals process in a
death penalty case. On the other hand, under the standards created
by these decisions, courts may still allow incompetent inmates to
waive appeals.164
A. Brief History of Competency in Death Penalty Cases
Under the English Common Law, the mentally incompetent
were not executed.165 The reasons for the rule are less concrete
than the rule itself, but one explanation is that the execution of a
mentally incompetent person offends humanity.166 Another
explanation is that that the execution of the mentally incompetent
does little, if anything, to deter others.167 As Sir Edward Coke
wrote in 1680, “by intendment of Law the execution of the
offender is for example . . . but so it is not when a mad man is
executed, but should be a miserable spectacle, both against Law,
and of extream (sic) inhumanity and cruelty. And can be no
example to others.”168 Other bases for the rule included religious
underpinnings, and the theory that madness is its own
punishment.169
161

384 U.S. 312 (1966) (establishing the test for deciding an inmate’s
competence to waive appeal of a death penalty sentence).
162
495 U.S. 149 (1990).
163
“Next friend” status refers to the ability to further an appeal of habeas
corpus proceeding on behalf of one who is incompetent to do so on their own.
Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 149; Rees, 384 U.S. at 312.
164
See Rees, 384 U.S. at 312. See also Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 149.
165
Kimberley S. Ackerson et al., Judges’ and Psychologists’ Assessments
of Legal and Clinical Factors in Competence for Execution, 11 PSYCH. PUB.
POL. AND L. 164, 165 (2005).
166
Ford, 477 U.S. at 407.
167
Id.
168
Id. (quoting E. COKE, 3 INSTITUTES 6 (6th ed. 1680)).
169
Id.
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At its founding, the United States embraced this ideology by
excluding the mentally incompetent from execution on the basis of
religious, humane, and societal reasons,170 but the Supreme Court
did not address the constitutionality of the issue until 1986, in Ford
v. Wainwright.171 Alvin Bernard Ford was convicted of murder and
sentenced to death for shooting a police officer three times in the
course of robbing a Red Lobster restaurant in Florida.172 After
approximately six years in prison,173 Ford developed signs of
serious mental disorders, which were later diagnosed by
psychiatrist Jamal Amin, on the basis of 14 months of evaluation,
as resembling “paranoid schizophrenia with suicide potential.”174
Ford filed a habeas corpus petition seeking an evidentiary hearing,
which the federal district court denied. The Eleventh Circuit
affirmed the denial.175
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to resolve
whether the Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of the
insane176 and, if so, whether the District Court for the Southern
District of Florida should have held a hearing on petitioner’s
claim.177 The Court found that the common law rationales for
prohibiting the execution of the insane were still relevant, and
questioned the retributive value of executing an insane person:178
The natural abhorrence civilized societies feel at killing one
who has no capacity to come to grips with his own
conscience or deity is still vivid today. And the intuiting
that such an execution simply offends humanity is
170

Ford, 477 U.S. at 399 (where the court found execution of the insane
unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment).
171
477 U.S. 399, 429-30 (1986).
172
Ford v. State, 374 So. 2d 496, 497 (Fla. 1979).
173
Ford, 477 U.S. at 402-03.
174
Id. at 403. The governor of Florida signed petitioner’s death warrant
after soliciting reports from a panel of psychiatrists who deemed Ford
competent. Id. at 404.
175
Id.
176
For the purposes of this Note, the terms “insane” and “mentally
incompetent” shall be synonymous and used interchangeably.
177
Id. at 409-10.
178
Id. at 409.
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evidently shared across this nation. Faced with such
widespread evidence of a restriction upon sovereign power,
this Court is compelled to conclude that the Eighth
Amendment prohibits a State from carrying out a sentence
of death upon a prisoner who is insane. Whether its aim be
to protect the condemned from fear and pain without
comfort of understanding, or to protect the dignity of
society itself from the barbarity of exacting mindless
vengeance, the restriction finds enforcement in the Eighth
Amendment.179
The Court held that the execution of the insane is “cruel and
unusual punishment” prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.180
Accordingly, Ford thus required psychological evaluations for
death row inmates with questionable mental conditions.181 The
Court held that when questions of competency for execution were
raised, due process entitled the defendant to an evidentiary
hearing.182 However, the Court failed to specify the fact-finding
procedures necessary for a determination of competency to be
executed.183 As the next section will illustrate, this vague mandate
complicates the issue of competency in voluntary death cases, in
part because Rees only requires a capacity to make a rational
choice, and does not scrutinize an inmate’s impetus for waiving
appeal.
B. Competency in “Volunteer” Cases: The Principles of Rees
v. Peyton
Some legal scholars have argued that anyone who chooses to

179

Id.
Id. See also U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
181
Ackerson, supra note 21, at 164.
182
Id.
183
Only Justice Powell, in his concurrence, addressed the legal test for
competency for execution, and stated that the Eighth Amendment “forbids the
execution only of those who are unaware of the punishment they are about to
suffer and why they are to suffer it.” Ford, 477 U.S. at 2608 (Powell, J.,
concurring).
180
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waive appeals and submit to execution is incompetent.184 While the
Supreme Court has rejected a per se rule of incompetency for
defendants who wish to waive their appeals,185 it has found
inmates incompetent to volunteer on an ad hoc basis, and laid out
its standard for doing so in Rees v. Peyton.186
In 1961, Melvin Davis Rees Jr. was convicted of murdering
three family members and sentenced to death by a state court in
Virginia.187 The judgment was affirmed on appeal in 1962.188
Thereafter, a habeas corpus petition was filed in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, alleging that the
state court conviction had violated Rees’s federal constitutional
rights.189 The District Court rejected these claims, and the Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed.190
Rees next filed a petition for certiorari to have the Supreme
Court review the Fourth Circuit’s decision on June 23, 1965.191
However, one month later, Rees directed his counsel to withdraw
the petition and forgo any further legal proceedings.192 In a letter to
his counsel on July 18, 1965, Rees wrote:
It is my mature & considered decision to withdraw from
before the U.S. Supreme Ct., as well as from all further
consideration, the petition you recently filed, & that Mr.
Crismond, the clerk of Spotsylvania county ct. be notified
that all legal proceedings have been abandoned.193
184

Richard C. Dieter, Ethical Choices for Attorneys Whose Clients Elect
Execution, 3 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 799 n. 115, 813 n.100 (1990).
185
Justice Rehnquist rejected the argument that anyone who chooses to
waive appeal and elect execution is incompetent. Rehnquist suggested that
sometimes the preservation of one’s own life is not the “highest good.” Lenhard
v. Wolff, 443 U.S. 1306, 1312-13 (1979) (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice).
186
384 U.S. 312, 312 (1966).
187
Rees v. Commonwealth, 127 S.E.2d 406 (Va. 1962).
188
Id.
189
Rees v. Peyton, 225 F. Supp. 507 (E.D. Va. 1964).
190
Id.
191
Id.
192
Petitioner’s counsel advised the court that since evidence cast doubt on
his client’s mental competency he could not conscientiously do so without a
psychiatric evaluation of petitioner. Id.
193
The letter went on to say:
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Ultimately, the Supreme Court heard Rees’ case on the issue of
waiving appeal, and on May 13, 1966, the Supreme Court
remanded Rees’s case to the district court and defined competency
for execution and how that competency is to be determined.194
Under Rees, to declare competency, the lower court must find that
the inmate has the “capacity to understand his position” and “make
a rational choice with respect to continuing or abandoning further
litigation.”195 On the other hand, if the lower court finds that the
inmate instead suffers from some type of mental illness that
substantially affects his or her capacity to make such a choice, the
inmate’s competency to waive appeal is called into question.196
In Dostoyevski’s novel “The Bros. Karamozov” Father Zossimas [sic]
elder Brother lay dying, sick & handicapped in many ways but there
was joy in His heart & to those that attended him he asked how it was
that we could go on holding grudges against one another & always
trying to out do one another when we could be entering the Garden in a
Spirit of Love & Friendliness & brotherhood to live a new & happy life
in the Name of Jesus Christ.
Phyllis L. Crocker, Not to Decide is to Decide: The U.S. Supreme Court’s
Thirty-Year Struggle with One Case About Competency to Waive Death Penalty
Appeals, 49 WAYNE L. REV. 885, 893 (2004). A transcript of Rees’s note was
found, verbatim, in a letter Rees’s attorney wrote to John F. Davis, the clerk of
the court. Id. at 892. Rees’s lawyer included other evidence of Rees’s mental
state in his letter. He noted that in 1960, Rees’s competence to stand trial on the
federal charges had been questioned. Although the federal district court found
Rees competent to stand trial, psychological evaluations noted that Rees’s
“‘judgment is relatively poor with respect both to grasp of conventional ideas
and to independent action,’ and that at times ‘his distinction between fact and
fantasy is poorly maintained and unrealistic ideas and actions are likely to be
numerous.’” Id. at 893 (quoting the letter).
194
The Court did not make a decision on the inmate’s competency but
rather determined that in aid of the proper exercise of the Supreme Court’s
certiorari jurisdiction, the Federal District Court in which the proceeding
commenced should make a judicial determination as to Rees’s mental
competence and then render a report back to the Supreme Court. Rees, 384 U.S.
at 314.
195
Id. The analysis is done at the time the inmate “volunteers.” This test
does not take into account his condition when he perpetrated the crimes. Id. at
908. See also Rees, 384 U.S. at 314.
196
Id. After laying out this standard, the court remanded the case to Judge
Oren R. Lewis, of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
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This test has both cognitive and volitional aspects.197
This test highlights the uncertain relationship between mental
illness and rational choice.198 The test asked if Rees was “suffering
from a mental disease, disorder or defect that may substantially
affect his capacity.”199 The imprecise nature of mental illness
leaves open the possibility that Rees could have been mentally ill
in a way that did not affect his judgment. At the same time, Rees
could have been found incompetent even if a firm correlation could
not be found.
The standard set forth in Rees is a difficult one because the two
alternative findings mentioned by the Court are not mutually
exclusive; a person with a mental disorder that “affects” his
decision-making could still make a rational choice, and
unequivocal cases of irrationality rarely arise.200 For instance, in
People v. Haynes, the defendant suffered from schizophrenia and
instructed his attorney to forgo appeals because he believed that
the future of civilization depended upon his death.201 This is a
unique case because the choice to waive appeal is clearly the result

Virginia, in July 1966. The Judge ascertained that Rees understood the likely
consequence of withdrawing his petition, but Rees’s response was insufficient to
conclude that he was competent to waive his appeal. Judge Lewis concluded that
Rees should be examined at the federal medical center in Springfield, Missouri,
and over the next three months, a team of doctors evaluated Rees at the
Springfield facility. Four doctors who examined him testified at an evidentiary
hearing to determine Rees’s competence in October of 1966. The four doctors
deemed Rees incompetent to withdraw his petition for writ of certiorari. On
January 12, 1967 Judge Lewis filed his report on Rees’s mental competence
with the Supreme Court. He concluded, “ Melvin Davis Rees, Jr. cannot at this
time make a rational choice with respect to continuing or abandoning further
litigation in his behalf. He is suffering from a major mental disorder,
schizophrenic reaction, chronic undifferentiated type, affecting his capacity in
the premises.” Crocker, supra note 192, at 909-14.
197
See supra note 195.
198
Id.
199
Rees, 384 U.S. at 313.
200
Richard J. Bonnie, The Death Penalty and Mental Illness: Mentally Ill
Prisoners on Death Row: Unsolved Puzzles for Courts and Legislatures, 54
CATH. U.L. REV. 1169, 1186 (2005).
201
737 N.E. 2d 169, 178 (Ill. 2000).
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of a mental delusion.202 However, the more typical case involves
articulated reasons that may seem “rational” under the
circumstances, including: a desire to take responsibility for one’s
actions, a belief that one deserves the death penalty, or a
preference for the death penalty over life imprisonment.203 In many
cases, “rational” choices may be rooted in suicidal motivations and
it is up to a judge to weigh the facts of the specific case and
identify the prevailing motivation.204 If the judge does find
incompetence, then a third party may be able to continue the
appeal on the inmate’s behalf. 205
C. Standing to Appeal on the Defendant’s Behalf: “Next
Friend” Status and the Principles of Whitmore v.
Arkansas
An important issue in many volunteer cases is determining who
may further appeal on behalf of an incompetent inmate.206 “Next
friend standing” allows an interested party to continue an appeal on
behalf of the inmate.207 In Whitmore v. Arkansas, the Court
determined whether a third party has standing to challenge the
validity of a death sentence imposed on a capital defendant who
has elected to forgo his right of appeal to the state’s highest
court.208
On December 28, 1987, Ronald Gene Simmons shot and killed
two people and wounded three others in the course of a rampage
through the town of Russellville, Arkansas.209 After police
apprehended Simmons, they searched his home in nearby Dover,
Arkansas and discovered the bodies of fourteen members of his
family, all of whom had been murdered.210
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210

Id.
Bonnie, supra note 200, at 1187.
Id.
Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 195.
Id.
Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 163.
Id. at 151.
Id at 151-52.
Id.
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After being tried and convicted of capital murder and
sentenced to death,211 Simmons stated under oath: “I, Ronald Gene
Simmons, Sr., want it to be known that it is my wish and my desire
that absolutely no action by anybody be taken to appeal or in any
way change this sentence.”212 Upon a competency hearing and
application of the Rees test, the court concluded that Simmons’s
decision was knowing and intelligent.213
Jonas Whitmore, another inmate on death row, petitioned the
Supreme Court of Arkansas to claim standing on Simmons’s
behalf or that, in the alternative, he qualified as next friend in
furthering Simmons’s appeal.214 After quickly dismissing the
standing argument, the Supreme Court presented considerable
discussion on the history and procedure of “next friend” status.215
As an alternative basis for standing to maintain this action the
petitioner tried to proceed as “next friend of Ronald Gene
Simmons.”216 Next friend status is most often requested on behalf
of detained prisoners who are unable, usually due to mental
211

Simmons was first tried for the Russelville crimes, and a jury convicted
him of capital murder and sentenced him to death. Id at 152.
212
He further stated that he requested the sentence be carried out
expeditiously. Id.
213
The state subsequently tried Simmons for the murder of his fourteen
family members and on February 10, 1989, a jury convicted him of capital
murder and imposed a sentence of death by lethal injection. Simmons again
notified the trial court of his desire to waive his right to direct appeal. After a
hearing, the court found Simmons competent to do so. Whitmore, 495 U.S. at
153.
214
Whitmore was an inmate who had already been convicted of murder and
sentenced to death, had exhausted his direct appellate review and had been
denied state post-conviction relief. Id. at 156.
215
Whitmore’s principal claim of injury in fact was that Arkansas has
established a system of comparative review in death penalty cases, and that he
had “a direct and substantial interest in having the data base against which his
crime is compared to be complete and to not be arbitrarily skewed by omission
of any other capital case.” He argued that the precedent set by hearing Simmon’s
appeal may benefit his own cause. The Court found this alleged injury too
speculative. Even if petitioner could show that he would be retried, convicted,
and sentenced, petitioner had not shown that Simmons’ convictions would be
pertinent to his proportionality review in the Supreme Court of Arkansas. Id.
216
Id. at 161-62.
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incompetence or inaccessibility, to seek relief themselves.217 A
next friend does not himself become a party to a habeas corpus
action in which he participates, but simply pursues the cause on
behalf of the detained person, who remains the real party in
interest.218
The Supreme Court made explicit that next friend standing is
not granted automatically to whomever seeks to pursue an action
on behalf of another.219 The Court determined two prerequisites for
next friend standing.220 First, a next friend “must provide an
adequate
explanation—such
as
inaccessibility,
mental
incompetence, or other disability—as to why the real party cannot
appear on his own behalf.”221 This prerequisite is not satisfied
where an evidentiary hearing shows that the defendant has given a
knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of his right to proceed,
and his access to court is otherwise unimpeded.222
Second, the next friend must be truly dedicated to the best
interests of the person on whose behalf he seeks to litigate.223 The
court suggests that a next friend must have some significant
relationship with the real party in interest.224 The burden is on the
217

See United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 13 (1955)
(prisoner’s sister brought habeas corpus proceeding while he was being held in
Korea). Some courts have additionally permitted “next friends” to prosecute
actions outside the habeas corpus context on behalf of infants, other minors, and
adult mental incompetents. See also Garnett v. Garnett, 114 Mass. 379, 380
(1874) (“next friend” may bring action for divorce on behalf of an insane
person); Blumentahl v. Craig, 81 F. 320, 321-22 (CA3 1897) (“next friend” was
admitted by court to prosecute personal injury action on behalf of the plaintiff,
who was a minor).
218
McClellan, supra note 15, at 229-31.
219
Id.
220
Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 161.
221
Id. at 163-64.
222
Id. at 165.
223
Id. at 163.
224
Id. See also Davis v. Austin, 492 F. Supp. 273, 275-76 (N.D. Ga. 1980)
(denying “next friend” standing to a minister and first cousin of prisoner
because, other than being philosophically and religiously opposed to the death
penalty, the minister and first cousin demonstrated little in the way of interest as
next friend).
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next friend to clearly establish the propriety of his or her status and
justify the jurisdiction of the court by showing that he or she is not
an intruder or uninvited meddler.225
The policy underlying these limitations is to prevent strangers
to the action from circumventing the restrictions of traditional
standing by claiming to be “next friends.”226 Once incompetency is
established the court only requires that the next friend be dedicated
to the best interests of the inmate.227
In Ross, the court used the Rees test to find competence and
avoided the issue of next friend standing.228 The application of this
test in the Ross case allowed a finding of competency without
adequately addressing the testimony of Ross’s supporters and
inquiring into Ross’s possible motivation for waiving appeal. The
possible existence of Death Row Syndrome exposes problems with
the efficiency and reliability of the Rees and Whitmore tests, which
may be solved through nonwaivable mandatory appeals.
IV. ANALYSIS AND SOLUTION: MANDATORY APPEAL
One way to eradicate many of the discrepancies and
controversies that accompany the use of the Rees and Whitmore
tests, in light of the Court’s recent willingness to look toward the
guidance of international courts in Ropper, is to institute
mandatory, non-waivable appeals in death penalty cases.229 Some
states have interpreted Faretta v. California as creating a right to
waive appeal.230 In response, the New Jersey Supreme Court
instituted nonwaivable mandatory appeals, which could solve the
problems associated with Death Row Syndrome and the Rees and
Whitmore tests.

225

Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 164.
Id. at 178.
227
Id. at 177.
228
See infra Part I.
229
Rees, 384 U.S. 312; Whitmore, 495 U.S. 173.
230
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (where the court allowed an
inmate to control his own defense and waive assistance of counsel).
226
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A. Faretta v. California
The Supreme Court has not decided a case on the issue of
volunteering for execution, but some Supreme Court Justices have
favored mandatory appeal as a way to ensure the efficiency and
fairness of a death penalty conviction.231 In Whitmore, Justice
Marshall stated that “a defendant’s voluntary submission to a
barbaric punishment does not ameliorate the harm that imposing
such a punishment causes to our basic societal values and to the
integrity of our system of justice.”232
In the absence of a clear opinion, some state courts have
interpreted Faretta v. California233 as establishing a capital
defendant’s constitutional right to waive the presentation of
mitigating evidence at sentencing.234 In Faretta, Anthony Faretta
attempted to waive assistance of counsel, but the trial court
appointed a public defender. The trial court found that Faretta had
not intelligently and knowingly waived his right to counsel, and
had no constitutional right to conduct his own defense.235 The
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the state could not
constitutionally force a lawyer upon a petitioner who voluntarily
exercised his informed free will.236
The Faretta Court recognized a right to self-representation
under the Sixth Amendment and found that the trial court was
barred from interfering with the accused’s right to present a
defense in his own fashion.237 Farretta had a constitutional right to
proceed without counsel because States cannot “force a lawyer”
231

Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012, 1020 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting);
Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 173 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also Casey, supra note
8, at 86.
232
Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 173 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
233
Faretta, 422 U.S. at 806.
234
Some courts allowing Faretta to be used to not present mitigating
evidence, which amounts to offering no defense. Extrapolated, some have
argued that this allows an inmate not to present a defense at all, thus letting them
waive appeals. Casey, supra note 8, at 82-83.
235
Faretta, 422 U.S. at 808-10.
236
Id. at 835-36.
237
Id. at 819.
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upon a defendant.238 However, arguably, Faretta only stands for
the requirement that nothing interfere with the defendant’s right to
present his or her own defense; it does not establish an inmate’s
right to waive appeal.239
B. New Jersey: Mandatory Non-Waivable Appeals
Presently, only New Jersey has non-waivable appeals in all
aspects of death penalty cases.240 The New Jersey approach to
mandatory appeals imposes, through judicial decision, a nonwaivable application for post-conviction relief and the presentation
of mitigating evidence.241 In New Jersey v. Martini, the New
Jersey Supreme Court concluded that certain important issues were
better raised on application for post- conviction relief and not on
appeal.242 Thereafter, the court ordered that counsel be appointed
for capital defendants who did not wish to pursue post-conviction
relief and that the defendant must present some type of mitigating
evidence at the sentencing part of the death penalty proceeding.243
These requirements are unwaivable.244
The New Jersey approach is based upon a narrow interpretation
of Faretta. Because the Supreme Court has yet to issue a decision
dealing directly with the problem of volunteering for execution,
some state courts have broadly interpreted Faretta as creating an

238

Id. at 807.
See Casey, supra note 8, at 83.
240
Id. at 87.
241
Id.
242
State v. Martini, 144 A.2d 1106, 1112-13 (N.J. 1996).
243
Id. The New Jersey Supreme Court recognized that there “must be an
end to the process” at some point and thus required an expedited procedure for
the consideration of post-conviction relief applications when the capital
defendant is opposed to the application. Id. The Supreme Court established that
the capital sentencer must consider and weigh mitigating evidence when
deciding whether to sentence a defendant to death. The result is that during a
capital sentencing hearing, the prosecution presents evidence showing
aggravating factors and the defendant is allowed to present evidence of
mitigating factors. Id. at 1112.
244
Id.
239

BLANK MACROED CORRECTED 7-30-06.DOC

DEATH PENALTY APPEALS

7/30/2006 12:35 PM

773

inmate’s right to waive appeal.245 For example, the Florida
Supreme Court relied on Faretta for the proposition that a trial
court could not appoint outside counsel to argue against the death
penalty because under the Sixth Amendment right to selfrepresentation “all competent defendants have a right to control
their own destinies.”246 These courts have extended the “right to
representation” to stand for the decision to refuse representation.247
New Jersey has been able to constitutionally justify
implementing nonwaivable mandatory appeals by narrowly
interpreting Faretta to stand only for the proposition that a
defendant can represent himself, not that a defendant can waive a
defense all together.248 In Faretta, the Court relied on the Sixth
Amendment to find that a defendant had a right to represent
himself and that the state could not interfere with the personal
defense of the defendant.249 Faretta never contemplated a
defendant waiving his defense all together.250 If the defendant
raises no defense, then arguably the Sixth Amendment is not
implicated.251 Therefore, there would be no constitutional right
prohibiting courts from imposing mandatory, nonwaivable appeals
245

Casey, supra note 8, at 82-83.
Hamblen v. State, 527 So. 2d 800, 804 (Fla. 1998) (where William
Hamblen was indicted for first degree murder and allowed to represent himself
and waive his right to have a jury consider whether he should be executed) as
quoted in Casey, supra note 8, at 86.
247
The Sixth Amendment provides that:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have
been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against
him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,
and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI. See also, John R. Mitchell, Attorneys Representing
Death Row Clients: Client Autonomy Over Personal Opinions, 25 CAP. U.L.
REV. 643, 652 (1996).
248
Casey, supra note 8, at 87.
249
See generally Faretta, 422 U.S. 806.
250
Id.
251
Casey, supra note 8, at 85.
246
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in death penalty cases.252
New Jersey’s nonwaivable appeals are further supported by
two other principles. The first is derived from Furman: procedural
waivers undermine the state’s important responsibility for
maintaining the consistent and appropriate application of the death
penalty.253 In Furman, the Supreme Court held that for a death
sentence to be constitutional, the Eighth Amendment requires that
the sentence be imposed in a non-arbitrary manner.254 This
guarantees to society at large that the integrity of the criminal
justice system will be maintained.255 Therefore, a defendant cannot
waive appeal, and allow the state to impose a punishment that
would otherwise violate the Eighth Amendment.256
The New Jersey Supreme Court’s other consideration was the
state’s interest in restricting the risk of state-sponsored executions.
This risk outweighs the interest of any single defendant to control
his or her own fate.257 This argument is once again founded in a
state’s interest in a non-arbitrary death penalty.258 The state takes
the position that allowing a defendant’s possible death wish to
determine if an execution occurs undermines a non-arbitrary death
penalty. A death sentence applied appropriately and consistently
cannot take into account a defendant’s death wish, but rather only
focus on the justness and fairness of the execution.259
C. New Jersey, Death Row Syndrome, and the Ross Case
New Jersey has now stayed all executions via a moratorium,260
252

State v. Martini, 144 N.J. 603, 617 (N.J. 1996). See also Casey, supra
note 8, at 64.
253
Casey, supra note 8, at 94.
254
Furman, 408 U.S. at 242.
255
Martini, 144 N.J. at 617. See also Casey, supra note 8, at 95.
256
Martini, 144 N.J. at 617. See also Casey, supra note 8, at 95.
257
Casey supra note 8, at 95.
258
Id.
259
Id. at 96.
260
2005 N.J. ALS 321. New Jersey passed a one year moratorium on the
death penalty while it considers abolishing the death penalty altogether. The
moratorium began in January 2006. Id. Although 10 people are on New Jersey’s
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so there will be no experience with non-waivable appeals for other
states to draw upon. Nonetheless, the analysis conducted by the
New Jersey courts is relevant to determining the effect of
mandatory nonwaivable appeals on the emergence of Death Row
Syndrome and how the syndrome affects how a state balances its
interest in maintaining a non-arbitrary death penalty with an
inmate’s interest in controlling his own destiny. By considering
how mandatory nonwaivable appeals would have affected the Ross
decision, the hypothetical shows how mandatory nonwaivable
appeals would virtually eliminate the dangers inherent with Death
Row Syndrome.
The argument against mandatory nonwaivable appeals in light
of the emergence of Death Row Syndrome is that mandatory
nonwaivable appeals could actually lead to more cases of Death
Row Syndrome.261 Arguably, nonwaivable mandatory appeals
would sufficiently lengthen the judicial process and the amount of
time an inmate spends on death row. This could increase the
chance of Death Row Syndrome and possibly create a cyclical and
inefficient death penalty system.262 Furthermore, these new
procedures would substantially increase the cost to the state not
only through the added appeals but also from the cost of caring for
inmates who became incompetent while awaiting execution.
Proponents of mandatory appeals argue that the appeals would
streamline litigation, and create a faster and more efficient death
penalty. As illustrative from the Ross case, part of the reason for
the long delay was the ancillary litigation that arose from friends,
family and supporters once Ross elected to waive appeal.263 This
litigation was costly and added to the anguish of the victims,
supporters, and all involved, and could have been significantly
reduced if there were nonwaivable mandatory appeals. The
nonwaivable mandatory appeals would create a finite number of
court appearances and steps in order to concentrate the energies of
death row, it has been 43 years since the last execution. Barbara S. Rothschild,
8th Limits Punishment, Bail, COURIER-POST (Cherry Hill, New Jersey) Mar. 1,
2006.
261
DPIC, Time on Death Row, supra note 12.
262
Id.
263
See infra Part II.
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the court and resources of all the parties involved. While some
cases in which inmates waive appeals at early stages will be made
longer, this system would have reduced the amount of time Ross
spent fighting the court system.
Proponents of mandatory appeals also argue that without
mandatory appeals, given the existence of Death Row Syndrome, a
state’s interest in maintaining a non-arbitrary death penalty may be
hindered. Arguably, the existence of Death Row Syndrome
encourages courts to expedite executions to prevent further inmates
from developing Death Row Syndrome. An expedited death
penalty would undermine the reason for the appeals process in the
first place and threaten the efficiency and arbitrariness of the death
penalty.264 Mandatory appeals ensure a uniform process and
prevent courts from expediting sentences in order to prevent new
cases of Death Row Syndrome.
The risk of an inmate developing Death Row Syndrome must
be weighed against the possibility of executing an innocent person.
Allowing inmates to waive their mandatory review of death
penalty convictions jeopardizes the validity and efficiency of a
conviction.265 There are many instances in which defendants waive
appeal not because of a calculated decision, but because of a
mental illness or Death Row Syndrome.266 For example, Isidore
Zimmerman attempted to expedite his death sentence even though
he was innocent. The psychological torture of being on death row
pushed him to pursue death. However, immediately prior to his
execution he was exonerated.267
Many of the complications in the Ross case due to Death Row
Syndrome would have never arisen had there been mandatory
nonwaivable appeals because the process ensures that every
precaution has been taken.268 In Ross, the courts did not adequately
264

DPIC, Time on Death Row, supra note 12.
Sara L. Golden, Constitutionality of the Federal Death Penalty Act: Is
the Lack of Mandatory Appeal Really Meaningful Appeal?, 74 TEMP. L. REV.
429, 430, 442 (2001).
266
See supra Part I.
267
Strafer, supra note 8, at 869 as found in McClellan, supra note 15, at
211.
268
Golden, supra note 218, at 467-68.
265
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contemplate and examine Ross’s underlying motivation for
waiving appeal. The New Jersey approach to mandatory
nonwaivable appeals would contemplate the existence of Death
Row Syndrome in every volunteer and prevent an inmate from
expediting the death penalty process. While the longer appeals
process may result in more reported cases of Death Row Syndrome
and increased costs, the mandatory nonwaivable appeals eliminates
the risk of killing an innocent person who developed Death Row
Syndrome and helps ensure a non-arbitrary death penalty.269
CONCLUSION
On May 14, 2005, Michael Ross was put to death, ending 20
years of litigation. Ross was a rapist and murderer, and in the eyes
of some, may have rightfully been put to death. However, the
process by which he was ultimately executed is riddled with
problems and inconsistencies.
There is a very thin line between state-sponsored executions
and state-assisted suicide. States are forced to weigh the state
interest in preventing suicide and maintaining the consistent and
appropriate application of the death penalty with an inmate’s
interest in controlling his own destiny. In the wake of
acknowledgment and identification of the adverse affects of living
on death row for extended periods by international courts, United
States Supreme Court Justices, and the New Jersey and Florida
state courts, the Supreme Court of the United States should pay
more heed to the possibility of Death Row Syndrome and more
fully scrutinize Ross’s motivation for waiving appeal.
Following New Jersey’s lead, the adoption of non-waivable
mandatory appeals would presume Death Row Syndrome in every
inmate and eliminate the controversy and inconsistencies that
accompany the Rees and Whitmore tests.270 This would ensure
efficiency and uniformity to an already convoluted and
controversial issue.

269
270

Id.
See supra Part II.

